Files
auth-jwt/CHANGELOG.md
T

2.9 KiB

Changelog

v1.1.2 — 2026-08-08

Patch — coordinated framework version alignment. Bumped auth, contracts, core, web to v1.1.2; README install line updated to v1.1.2.

v1.1.1 — 2026-08-07

Patch — coordinated framework version alignment. Bumped auth, contracts, core, web to v1.1.1. No code or API changes.

v1.1.0 — 2026-08-07

Coordinated framework version alignment — released in lockstep at v1.1.0.

Changed

  • Bumped einherjar dependencies (auth, contracts, core, web) to v1.1.0 via go get + go mod tidy. No code or API changes.

v1.0.0

Initial release.

Signers and Verifiers

  • Verifier interface — Verify(tokenString string) (*jwt.Token, error)
  • Signer interface — extends Verifier; adds Sign(claims jwt.Claims) (string, error)
  • NewHMACSigner(secret []byte) Signer — HMAC-SHA256 (HS256)
  • NewRSASigner(privateKey *rsa.PrivateKey) Signer — RSA-SHA256 (RS256); public key derived from private
  • NewRSASignerFromPEM(pemKey []byte) (Signer, error) — parses PKCS#8 or PKCS#1 PEM
  • NewRSAPublicKeyVerifier(publicKey *rsa.PublicKey) Verifier — verify-only; use when the service never issues tokens
  • NewRSAPublicKeyVerifierFromPEM(pemKey []byte) (Verifier, error) — parses PKIX or PKCS#1 PEM
  • NewECSigner(privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) Signer — ECDSA; algorithm auto-detected from curve (P-256→ES256, P-384→ES384, P-521→ES512)
  • NewECSignerFromPEM(pemKey []byte) (Signer, error) — parses PKCS#8 PEM
  • NewECPublicKeyVerifier(publicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) Verifier — EC verify-only
  • NewECPublicKeyVerifierFromPEM(pemKey []byte) (Verifier, error) — parses PKIX PEM
  • All Verify implementations use jwt.WithJSONNumber() — preserves large int64 bitmasks through JSON round-trip

Token issuance

  • TokenConfig struct — AccessTTL time.Duration, RefreshTTL time.Duration, Issuer string
  • TokenPair struct — AccessToken string, RefreshToken string, ExpiresIn int64
  • IssueTokenPair(signer, uid, customClaims, cfg) (TokenPair, error) — signs access + refresh pair; customClaims merged at top level of access token; refresh token carries only sub/iss/iat/exp/jti/fam

Token refresh

  • Blacklist interface — IsRevoked(ctx, jti) (bool, error) + Revoke(ctx, jti, ttl) error; satisfied by cache-valkey via duck typing
  • ErrTokenRevoked — sentinel error; use errors.Is(err, authjwt.ErrTokenRevoked) to detect replay attacks
  • RefreshTokenPair(ctx, signer, refreshToken, bl, cfg, customClaims) (TokenPair, error) — validates token, checks blacklist, revokes old JTI, issues new pair; customClaims re-embedded in new access token

HTTP middleware

  • AuthMiddleware(logger, verifier, publicPaths) func(http.Handler) http.Handler — verifies Bearer tokens; calls authmw.SetTokenData on success; routes 401 through httputil.Error; publicPaths support path.Match wildcards