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chore(auth-jwt): bump einherjar deps to v1.1.0 (framework version alignment)

Patch of the coordinated framework release: einherjar modules move to v1.1.0
in lockstep, so auth-jwt is bumped alongside the rest.

- go.mod: auth, contracts, core, web -> v1.1.0 (via go get + go mod tidy)

No code or API changes. ModuleVersion() reports v1.1.0 automatically from
build info once tagged. Badge bumped to v1.1.0.

2026-08-07 19:33:44 -06:00

3.7 KiB

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einherjar/auth-jwt

A warrior's seal is recognized anywhere — but only if it cannot be forged.

JWT authentication middleware and token lifecycle management for the Einherjar framework. Supports HMAC-SHA256 (HS256), RSA-SHA256 (RS256), and ECDSA (ES256/ES384/ES512).

API

Symbol	Kind	Description
`Verifier`	interface	Validates JWT strings
`Signer`	interface	Extends `Verifier`; also signs tokens
`NewHMACSigner(secret)`	func	HS256 signer
`NewRSASigner(key)`	func	RS256 signer
`NewRSASignerFromPEM(pem)`	func	RS256 signer from PKCS#8/PKCS#1 PEM
`NewRSAPublicKeyVerifier(key)`	func	RS256 verifier (verify-only)
`NewRSAPublicKeyVerifierFromPEM(pem)`	func	RS256 verifier from PKIX/PKCS#1 PEM
`NewECSigner(key)`	func	ES256/384/512 signer (curve auto-detected)
`NewECSignerFromPEM(pem)`	func	EC signer from PKCS#8 PEM
`NewECPublicKeyVerifier(key)`	func	EC verifier (verify-only)
`NewECPublicKeyVerifierFromPEM(pem)`	func	EC verifier from PKIX PEM
`TokenConfig`	struct	AccessTTL, RefreshTTL, Issuer
`TokenPair`	struct	AccessToken, RefreshToken, ExpiresIn
`IssueTokenPair(signer, uid, claims, cfg)`	func	Sign access + refresh pair
`Blacklist`	interface	JTI revocation store (duck-typed by cache-valkey)
`ErrTokenRevoked`	var	Sentinel for replay-attack detection
`RefreshTokenPair(ctx, signer, token, bl, cfg, claims)`	func	Rotate tokens with blacklist check
`AuthMiddleware(logger, verifier, publicPaths)`	func	HTTP middleware — verifies Bearer token, calls `authmw.SetTokenData`

Dependency graph

contracts/logging  ──► auth-jwt
contracts/security ──► auth-jwt  (via auth/authmw)
core/xerrors       ──► auth-jwt
web/httputil       ──► auth-jwt
auth/authmw        ──► auth-jwt
jwt/v5             ──► auth-jwt  (only external dependency)

Wiring example — HMAC, full stack

import (
    "code.nochebuena.dev/einherjar/auth-jwt"
    "code.nochebuena.dev/einherjar/auth/authmw"
    "code.nochebuena.dev/einherjar/auth/rbac"
)

signer := authjwt.NewHMACSigner([]byte(os.Getenv("JWT_SECRET")))
cfg := authjwt.TokenConfig{
    AccessTTL:  15 * time.Minute,
    RefreshTTL: 7 * 24 * time.Hour,
    Issuer:     "myapp",
}

// JWT verification runs first (global).
srv.Use(authjwt.AuthMiddleware(logger, signer, []string{"/health", "/auth/*"}))

// Enrichment and authz follow.
srv.Use(authmw.EnrichmentMiddleware(logger, userEnricher))

const ReadOrders = security.Permission(0)
srv.With(authmw.AuthzMiddleware(logger, permissions, "orders", ReadOrders)).
    Get("/orders", ordersHandler)

// Login handler issues tokens:
pair, err := authjwt.IssueTokenPair(signer, uid, customClaims, cfg)

// Refresh handler rotates tokens:
newPair, err := authjwt.RefreshTokenPair(ctx, signer, body.RefreshToken, blacklist, cfg, freshClaims)
if errors.Is(err, authjwt.ErrTokenRevoked) {
    // replay attack — return 401 and require re-login
}

Verifier-only microservice (RSA)

// Service that verifies tokens but never issues them.
verifier, err := authjwt.NewRSAPublicKeyVerifierFromPEM([]byte(os.Getenv("RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM")))
srv.Use(authjwt.AuthMiddleware(logger, verifier, publicPaths))

Environment variables

None. All configuration is passed in code.

Install

go get code.nochebuena.dev/einherjar/auth-jwt@v1.0.0

3.7 KiB Raw Blame History