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auth-jwt/CHANGELOG.md

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feat(auth-jwt): initial implementation — JWT lifecycle and AuthMiddleware (v1.0.0) Introduces code.nochebuena.dev/einherjar/auth-jwt — JWT authentication middleware and token lifecycle management for the Einherjar framework. Absorbs httpauth-jwt from micro-lib with three changes: logger parameter on AuthMiddleware, httputil.Error for consistent 401 responses, and added ECDSA support. Signers and Verifiers (one file per implementation — CT-6 compliant): - Verifier interface — Verify(tokenString string) (*jwt.Token, error) - Signer interface — extends Verifier; adds Sign(claims jwt.Claims) (string, error) - signer_hmac.go — NewHMACSigner(secret) → HS256; jwt.WithJSONNumber() on Verify - signer_rsa.go — NewRSASigner(key) + NewRSASignerFromPEM(pem) → RS256 - verifier_rsa.go — NewRSAPublicKeyVerifier + NewRSAPublicKeyVerifierFromPEM → RS256 verify-only - signer_ec.go — NewECSigner(key) + NewECSignerFromPEM(pem) → ES256/384/512; algorithm auto-detected from key curve (P-256→ES256, P-384→ES384, P-521→ES512) - verifier_ec.go — NewECPublicKeyVerifier + NewECPublicKeyVerifierFromPEM → EC verify-only Token lifecycle: - TokenConfig struct — AccessTTL, RefreshTTL, Issuer - TokenPair struct — AccessToken, RefreshToken, ExpiresIn - IssueTokenPair — access + refresh pair; customClaims merged at top level; refresh carries only sub/iss/iat/exp/jti/fam; jwt.WithJSONNumber() preserves int64 bitmasks - Blacklist interface — IsRevoked + Revoke; satisfied by cache-valkey via duck typing - ErrTokenRevoked — errors.New sentinel; errors.Is pattern for replay-attack detection - RefreshTokenPair — verifies token, checks blacklist, revokes old JTI, issues new pair HTTP middleware: - AuthMiddleware(logger, verifier, publicPaths) — verifies Bearer tokens; calls authmw.SetTokenData on success; 401 routed through httputil.Error (Warn level); publicPaths use path.Match wildcards; accepts Verifier (not Signer) to enforce narrowest-interface principle for verify-only services Compliance test (package authjwt_test) enforces CT-6 (≤1 exported TypeSpec/file), compile-time interface satisfaction, and behavioural coverage: HMAC/RSA/EC sign+verify, algorithm mismatch rejection, IssueTokenPair claims/jti/fam, RefreshTokenPair success/ revoked/blacklist-error/custom-claims, MaxInt64 json.Number precision, AuthMiddleware valid/invalid/expired/missing/public-path/wildcard/JSON-body/RSA-verifier/SetTokenData. Depends on auth v1.0.0, contracts v1.0.0, core v1.0.0, web v1.0.0, jwt/v5 v5.2.1. - identifiable.go: package-level Module variable (observability.Identifiable) for version identification — auth-jwt is a function library; not registered with the launcher
2026-05-29 16:13:01 +00:00
# Changelog
## v1.0.0
Initial release.
### Signers and Verifiers
- `Verifier` interface — `Verify(tokenString string) (*jwt.Token, error)`
- `Signer` interface — extends `Verifier`; adds `Sign(claims jwt.Claims) (string, error)`
- `NewHMACSigner(secret []byte) Signer` — HMAC-SHA256 (HS256)
- `NewRSASigner(privateKey *rsa.PrivateKey) Signer` — RSA-SHA256 (RS256); public key derived from private
- `NewRSASignerFromPEM(pemKey []byte) (Signer, error)` — parses PKCS#8 or PKCS#1 PEM
- `NewRSAPublicKeyVerifier(publicKey *rsa.PublicKey) Verifier` — verify-only; use when the service never issues tokens
- `NewRSAPublicKeyVerifierFromPEM(pemKey []byte) (Verifier, error)` — parses PKIX or PKCS#1 PEM
- `NewECSigner(privateKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) Signer` — ECDSA; algorithm auto-detected from curve (P-256→ES256, P-384→ES384, P-521→ES512)
- `NewECSignerFromPEM(pemKey []byte) (Signer, error)` — parses PKCS#8 PEM
- `NewECPublicKeyVerifier(publicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey) Verifier` — EC verify-only
- `NewECPublicKeyVerifierFromPEM(pemKey []byte) (Verifier, error)` — parses PKIX PEM
- All `Verify` implementations use `jwt.WithJSONNumber()` — preserves large int64 bitmasks through JSON round-trip
### Token issuance
- `TokenConfig` struct — `AccessTTL time.Duration`, `RefreshTTL time.Duration`, `Issuer string`
- `TokenPair` struct — `AccessToken string`, `RefreshToken string`, `ExpiresIn int64`
- `IssueTokenPair(signer, uid, customClaims, cfg) (TokenPair, error)` — signs access + refresh pair; `customClaims` merged at top level of access token; refresh token carries only `sub/iss/iat/exp/jti/fam`
### Token refresh
- `Blacklist` interface — `IsRevoked(ctx, jti) (bool, error)` + `Revoke(ctx, jti, ttl) error`; satisfied by `cache-valkey` via duck typing
- `ErrTokenRevoked` — sentinel error; use `errors.Is(err, authjwt.ErrTokenRevoked)` to detect replay attacks
- `RefreshTokenPair(ctx, signer, refreshToken, bl, cfg, customClaims) (TokenPair, error)` — validates token, checks blacklist, revokes old JTI, issues new pair; `customClaims` re-embedded in new access token
### HTTP middleware
- `AuthMiddleware(logger, verifier, publicPaths) func(http.Handler) http.Handler` — verifies Bearer tokens; calls `authmw.SetTokenData` on success; routes 401 through `httputil.Error`; `publicPaths` support `path.Match` wildcards